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5Approaches to Human Security
The concept of human security is related theoretically to the liberal 
school of thought in International Relations and Security Studies focusing on 
individuals as key subjects of security. This emphasis on the individual was 
already part of John Burton’s view on international security since the 1970s and 
has been qualified as the “conflict research” school by contrast with the realist 
“strategic studies” and the structuralist “peace research.” (1) It has been strongly 
revived after the end of the Cold war like other liberal and neo-Kantian concepts 
and approaches and got significant support within the research community.(2) As 
controversial as any of the concepts discussed in International Relations theory,(3) 
it has been criticized for underestimating the importance of states in security(4) 
and for contributing to post-Cold war views of the world based on inequality 
and hierarchy among states justifying Western interventionism.(5) Despite those 
critics it got support from important sectors of policymaking, think tanks, 
academia, and NGOs and has been promoted as a key component of a normative 
neo-Kantian approach to security challenging previous “state-centric” visions.(6)
The concept mainly surfaced in the world of policymaking in the early 
1990s when two international organizations, OECD and UNDP, started to quote 
the concept in their 1994 annual reports.(7) It became really popular at the end of 
the 1990s when Canada and Japan adopted it as an official policy.(8) The concept 
got growing popularity and intellectual support from universities, research 
centres, and advocacy groups within this context but these non-state actors 
played much less role than governments and IGOs during the emerging phase 
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of the concept. And also very interestingly, it was born in circles discussing 
development rather than security, but was considered later on as one of the 
challenges to the “traditional” state-centric definition of security.(9)
This article explores the origins of human security in policy agendas, 
why and how it has been used in policy formulation in Canada, Japan, and the 
European Union, and proposes explanations of the divergences between those 
three international actors about the political use of this concept though their 
concrete policymaking agendas are rather convergent. It concludes that the 
success of the concept is mainly based on the need for some international actors 
(both in states and in the United Nations apparatus) to build a new legitimacy on 
global norm entrepreneurship in a time of change. Furthermore the paper shows 
that this lack of common normative discourse has not prevented Canada, Europe, 
and Japan to shape together with other industrialized states – including the USA 
– a “liberal peace”(10) agenda summarized by the keywords “peace-building” and 
“security-development nexus” by rather intrusive policies of political, economic, 
judicial, and security control of post-conflict areas by Western donors and 
international agencies. Though weakened in its wide scope by the US-led fight 
against terrorism since 9.11.2001, human security has also proven to be very 
flexible and almost fully compatible with both neo-liberal economic agendas 
and “hard security” policies inspired by the US Administration.
I. Japanese and Canadian Policies and Their “Multilateralization”
In Japan, the reference to individuals' security faced up in policy discourse 
when Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s address to the UN General 
Assembly Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development in 1995 referred 
to "human-centered" social development as a focus of Japanese ODA. His vision 
was considered as part of a Japanese approach to multilateralism,(11) followed 
and reinforced by his successor Ryutaro Hashimoto who spoke of "security 
of human beings" when addressing the UN General Assembly in 1997. It was 
based on two principles inspired by the debates within OECD/DAC, UNDP and 
Commission on Global Governance: on one side, “respect for the human rights 
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of every citizen on earth”; on the other side, protection from “poverty, disease, 
ignorance, oppression, and violence”.(12)
The financial crisis in Asia which erupted in 1997 has been a strong 
incentive for the promotion of human security by the Japanese leadership.(13) 
It led foreign minister, and then prime minister Keizo Obuchi to promote the 
concept of “human security” in order to address Asia’s new regional economic 
challenges and to open up a more assertive and independent international role 
for Japan without undermining its alliance with the United States.(14) At the same 
time, human security became so a cornerstone of Japan’s foreign policy and a 
new way to define its overseas development assistance policy. Under Obuchi’s 
rule, Japan adopted what can be summarized as a comprehensive, multi-faceted 
approach to security: “In our times, humankind is under various kinds of threat. 
Environmental problems such as global warming are grave dangers not only for 
us but also for future generations. In addition, trans-national crimes such as illicit 
drugs and trafficking are increasing. Problems such as the exodus of refugees, 
violations of human rights, infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, terrorism, anti-
personnel landmines, and so on pose significant threats to all of us. Moreover, 
the problem of children under armed conflict ought never to be overlooked.”(15)
This definition of Human Security as “freedom from want” is echoing 
the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and makes Human Security almost synonymous to Human 
Development.(16) On this basis, the Japanese government supported in 1999 the 
establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) 
whose budget had risen to some USD 170 million by 2002 and was managed 
jointly by UNDP, UNESCO, UNHCR, and WHO.(17)
Though based on wider principles and conceptual approaches, this Japanese 
vision of human security has developed convergences with the Canadian plea 
for defining human security as “freedom from fear”.  These two approaches 
inspired decisively Kofi Annan’s speech at the 2000 United Nations’ Millennium 
Summit, as well as the Summit’s final declaration though it does not refer 
directly to human security.(18)
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After the Millennium Summit, Japan initiated the Commission on 
Human Security (CHS) co-chaired by the former UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees Sadako Ogata and Nobel Economics Prize-awarded Amartya Sen, 
and supported the holistic security concept promoted by CHS final report: “the 
aim of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways 
that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means 
protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life … It 
means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural 
systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood, and 
dignity.”(19)
Nevertheless, the CHS report was issued just before the 9.11 attacks in the 
United States and its impact was considerably reduced by a rapidly changing 
security environment. Facing China’s rising power, North Korea’s nuclear 
ambitions, and the US war on terror, Japan completely reassessed its foreign and 
security policy and strengthened its alliance with the US. It took part actively in 
the US’s so-called “war on terror” and sent non-fighting troops to Iraq between 
2004 and 2006. Japanese expectations about a permanent seat in the United 
Nations Security Council were also part of the motivations for such a change, 
which was nevertheless perceived as a retreat from the previous Japanese 
emphasis on multilateralism and the centrality of the United Nations.(20)
However, the Japanese approach to Human Security as developed by the 
CHS was not abandoned after September 11 and the Iraqi War. Interestingly, 
Japan's efforts were "multilateralized" through the adoption of human security 
by the UN Secretary-General and some UN agencies after the Millennium 
Summit. The recommendations of the CHS led in 2003 to the deepening of the 
reference to Human Security among UN agencies, especially the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), through the creation of an 
Advisory Board on Human Security (ABHS) designed for advising the UN 
Secretary-General on the management of the UNTFHS. Japanese diplomats, 
CHS former members, and UN agencies are playing the dominant role within 
the ABHS. To some extent, this successful “multilateralization” of the Japanese 
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Human Security concept allowed it to survive despite the evolution of Japan’s 
national foreign policy agenda towards a rather militarized threat assessment 
after 9.11 and Iraq. Rather than contradictory, the two agendas can therefore 
remain complementary and even increase the diversification of Japanese foreign 
policy objectives and international coalitions. Since the Japanese definition 
of human security is mainly equivalent to human development and based on 
a "securitized" updating of ODA priorities, it has contributed to the profile of 
Japan as a global "soft power" without undermining the country's identity. The 
adoption of this approach by the United Nations bureaucracy was also possible 
because the concept remains very civilian and is compatible with UN objectives. 
Canada is usually mentioned as the second medium power which used 
human security as a key component of its national security discourse in the 
1990s.(21) Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy played a pivotal role in promoting 
human security as "much more than the absence of military threat. It includes 
security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a 
guarantee of fundamental human rights."(22)
Rather than Japan’s wide "freedom from want" approach, Axworthy 
proposed a narrow "freedom from fear" agenda considered as more feasible and 
more adapted to Canadian traditions and political position.(23) Paramount issues 
were the establishment of a peace-building capacity, the banning of antipersonal 
landmines, the reduction of the flow of small arms and conflict commodities, the 
situation of children with regard to sexual abuse, child labor, and their protection 
from violence, the promotion of international criminal justice, and later on a 
renewed approach to development assistance, in addition to promotion of rules-
based trade to spur economic development.(24)
Canada's strategy was based on a two-track strategy: on one side, putting 
forward policy initiatives on specific issues in multilateral forums and on the 
other side, building coalitions with other countries and civil society including 
academia. Success stories of these efforts have been especially the Human 
Security Network established in 1999 by thirteen countries under a joint Canada-
Norway initiative(25) and the Human Security Report published in 2005 by the 
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Liu Institute at the University of British Columbia.(26)
Canada's plea for human security has been considered as an updating 
of Canadian traditional security interests inspired by the need to keep an 
international profile towards the United States and a reaction to evolving 
NATO's internal balance after the establishment of the new EU military policy 
(ESDP). By some critics, it was also described as an attempt to hide Canada's 
decreased participation in UN peacekeeping activities and cuts in military 
and development budgets.(27) Behind the diversity of motivations for such an 
evolution, there was obviously a new focus on several policy options and a 
securitization of the development agenda perfectly fitting OECD/DAC purposes.
Though engaged before, human security had been formalized as a foreign 
policy option. The campaign against anti-personnel landmines and the signing 
of the Ottawa Treaty are considered one of the most important outcomes of 
the Canadian human security policy and was converging with efforts by trans-
national advocacy NGOs and other countries, especially some third world 
countries and small and medium member states of the European Union like 
Belgium and Sweden.(28) Lloyd Axworthy considered it important to convince 
Japan to join this coalition in order to create a wider coalition and develop 
common agenda’s between the two major promoters of human security.(29)
Interestingly, the action leading to the Ottawa treaty was described as a 
bottom-up type of diplomatic conduct, with an unprecedented involvement of 
NGOs and the formation of trans-national advocacy networks mixing NGOs, 
diplomats, and international organizations. The result of this action was also 
based on a strategy bypassing existing inefficient international fora, locked by 
US veto like the UN Conference on Disarmament, and negotiating an ad hoc 
treaty outside existing institutional frameworks without an endorsement by 
several permanent members of the UNSC (not only the USA, but also Russia 
and China).(30) This strategy has been used to a lesser extent for other similar 
treaties which were never signed/ratified by the USA (International Criminal 
Court, Kyoto Protocol) and could be considered as one approach for Canada/
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EU/Japan-led coalitions when they obviously have to go beyond the traditional 
UNSC consensus-building.
Another key policy area in which Canada promoted human security was the 
strengthening of international criminal justice. The failure of the Blue Helmets 
under Canadian General Dallaire's command to prevent the genocide in Rwanda 
in 1994 and similar feelings of UN peacekeeping inefficiency in stopping war 
crimes and crimes against humankind within the context of civil wars like in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were strong incentives for promoting new approaches 
to international justice. Canada supported the creation of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), and later on 
the negotiation of the Rome Status of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Several leading Canadian lawyers like Louise Arbour (first Chief Prosecutor 
of ICTY and ICTR) and Philippe Kirsch (Chairman of the ICC) in these courts 
confirmed Canada's interest and visibility in this new policy.(31)
A more controversial consequence of the Canadian reappraisal of 
international response to human rights abuses was the increasing readiness of the 
Canadian leadership to justify the use of force in the case of human rights abuses, 
even when the UNSC does not authorize it explicitly. The 1999 Kosovo crisis 
was the occasion for Lloyd Axworthy to integrate this approach into his human 
security concept. In a speech delivered to the G-8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in 
Cologne in June 1999, he emphasized that "The norm of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states remains basic to international peace and security, 
and the intervention in Kosovo must not be held as a precedent justifying 
intervention anywhere, anytime, or for any reason. However, in cases of extreme 
abuse, as we have seen in Kosovo and Rwanda, among others, the concept of 
national sovereignty cannot be absolute."(32) Canada supported therefore the 
creation of an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS) which presented its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect in 2001 
discussing the concept of "humanitarian intervention" related to the Canadian 
human security concept, and when, how and under which authority such 
interventions can be performed.(33) Despite all controversies about the concept 
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of "humanitarian intervention" and “responsibility to protect” (or R2P), the 
ICISS report has been widely discussed and shows the impact of the Canadian 
influence in the field, including within the United Nations’ apparatus since the 
ICISS report has influenced several paragraphs of the High Level Group’s report 
on Threats, Risks and Opportunities commissioned by Kofi Annan and published 
in 2004.(34) Like Japan, Canada was to some extent able to “multilateralize” its 
own approach but with less success since most of the Canadian core agenda for 
human security was never endorsed fully by the major UNSC powers. 
As we can see, human security has helped both Japan and Canada, two 
members of the G-8 but not of the UNSC, to strengthen their international profile 
and differentiate their international identity as an US ally without undermining 
this key alliance within a context of limited capacities and rapid international 
change (for Japan, the financial crisis in Asia and the attempts to get a permanent 
seat in the UN; for Canada the fear to be marginalized within NATO between 
the USA and an expanding and deepening EU). These very similar motivations 
show why, despite differences between their respective focuses on "freedom 
from want" and "freedom from fear", Japan and Canada have converged in 
shaping the concept of human security as their contribution to a "new security" 
agenda. Before the United Nations Millennium Summit, they were able to create 
a joint platform for lobbying the other UN member-states, adopted a Canada-
Japan Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation, and got support from 
Kofi Annan, who referred to "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear" in 
his opening speech.(35)
Many similarities can also be described in the way they promoted the 
concept:
• both foreign policies have put the emphasis on the security of individuals;
• both concepts were developed by political elites, with a strong 
contribution by one foreign minister (and later Prime Minister in the case 
of Japan) on each side;
• both strategies were based on coalition-building at the inter-state level 
and the creation of an epistemic community at the trans-national level, 
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with a strong emphasis on NGOs, academia and advocacy groups;
• both concepts were helping to differentiate from the USA at low cost;
• both agendas became quickly operational and encompassed concrete 
policy cases.
Furthermore, despite their differences and the maintenance of separate policies 
under the heading "human security,"(36) a common agenda has been established 
de facto at the crossroads of military security and development policies, 
encompassing the following policy arenas all related to a wider definition of 
peace-building:
• elimination of anti-personnel landmines;
• combating proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons 
(SALW);
• implementing effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programs for combatants in conflict/post-conflict areas, especially 
child soldiers;
• working towards security sector reform (SSR) and good governance in 
security sector, including not only the armed forces, but the police and 
criminal justice system;
• promoting collaboration with civil society, especially women's groups, 
in peace-building activities (though Japanese NGOs remained almost 
uninvolved);
• introduction of peace-building conditionality clauses in agreements with 
countries concerned.
II. The Western peace-building consensus
This agenda has been integrated into most of the policies discussed 
within OECD/DAC towards so-called "fragile states," converge widely with 
World Bank's policy in the same field, and represent the basis for what Mark 
Duffield, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver Richmond called "the liberal peace 
agenda."(37) Inspired by a “soft power” or “civilian power” approach for Japan, 
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and by a more “robust” approach for Canada, the human security concept and 
its implementation has served to make the two countries stronger partners in 
this joint agenda. For Japan, it helped to build a more assertive profile and more 
comprehensive security role corresponding to its post-Cold War challenges.(38) 
For Canada, it contributed to keep a “hard security” identity extending 
Canada’s world security role despite the reduction of its military budget and 
forces deployed abroad. For both of them, this helped to build an “alternative” 
security agenda, alternative because it was developed almost without the 
main powers of the UNSC, though its content was very much corresponding 
to OECD/DAC and World Bank mainstream policies regarding the security-
development nexus. Most European countries have also embarked onto the same 
kind of peace-building agenda though almost never using the human security 
concept for addressing it. The convergence between all Western donor states 
about this core joint agenda for connecting security to development happened 
within the context of the OECD/DAC, especially when it discussed the ways 
to address conflict prevention and peace-building in development policies.(39) 
Within this context it mapped the four dimensions of peace-building that donor 
states have to address through their security and development policies. These 
four dimensions have been almost identically defined within the EU conflict 
prevention programme adopted during the Gothenborg European Council in 
June 2001. The following figure summarizes these four dimensions.
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This catalogue of peace-building policies is integrating most of what 
Canada on one side and Japan on the other side have called “human security” 
but it is to some extent mixing the two agendas, expanding and re-organizing 
them, and putting aside the whole debate about the Responsibility to Protect 
promoted mainly by Canada. Except for the latter, the security dimension 
of peace-building according to OECD/DAC and the EU gathers all policies 
related directly to the security-development nexus and the securitization of 
the development agenda: de-mining activities; destruction of small arms and 
light weapons (SALW); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
activities; security sector/system reform (SSR); and the deployment of civilian 
police forces (CIVPOL) and of peacekeeping forces. Most of these activities 
have been already identified as a core Japan-Canada agenda for human security 
while others are mainly promoted by Canada and European countries and almost 
ignored by Japan (peacekeeping and the most interventionist aspects of CIVPOL 
deployments).
OECD/DAC countries have closely related this security dimension with 
two other dimensions of the peace-building agenda: the political/governance 
(mediation in conflict resolution, monitoring of elections, support to local 
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administration, support to institution-building, association of civil society, and 
international territorial administration); and the rule of law dimensions (support 
to human rights, fight against human trafficking, support to the rebuilding of 
the judicial, support to local criminal courts – also called transitional justice, 
and the establishment of international criminal courts). This interdependence 
between security, governance, and the rule of law has been encompassed within 
the OECD/DAC by the concept of “security system reform” considered as wider 
than “security sector reform.”
The last dimension includes all economic, social and environmental 
activities which can contribute to peace-building: rebuilding of infrastructure; 
support to refugees and displaced persons; trade and investment; implementation 
of long-term Millennium Development Goals; support to sustainable 
development; and the control of natural resources and conflict commodities. 
This whole catalogue of activities around the four dimensions of peace-
building has been shaped step by step since the mid-1990s within the OECD/
DAC as the common agenda of donor states about the security-development 
nexus. It implies a rather interventionist and centralized approach to the “liberal 
peace agenda” in which donor states and international organizations play the 
leading role in defining principles of governance, security and development. 
Canada, Japan and the European Union countries have all experienced 
the outcomes of this approach, sometimes together, sometimes separately, 
sometimes with the USA, in cases like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo, and even Iraq for some of them. Though not 
exactly identical in their origins, these experiences converged with the US 
dilemma’s about nation-building which occurred in parallel. In such cases, 
Western donors and international institutions have increasingly pointed the 
ineffectiveness of some states to secure their citizens and therefore justified their 
increasingly intrusive and interventionist policies.(40) Not surprisingly, when this 
Western predominance leads to substitution of international control on national 
sovereignty (international territorial administration, control of economic policies 
and resources, international criminal courts, and military intervention), there are 
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more divergences not only with recipient states, but also among donor states. 
While Canada, the UK and some other European states (mainly those who 
took part in the Human Security Network) have been rather assertive in their 
definition of peace-building tasks, Japan, Sweden, and other European states 
have usually emphasized a civilian and inclusive approach to those dimensions 
of peace-building, and remained reluctant to deep interventionism.
Despite these nuances, the core Western peace-building agenda is gathering 
Canada, Japan, and the European Union states. For Canada and Japan, it is 
perfectly in line with their emphasis on human security, even when the concept 
has been challenged by international events. The consequences of the 9.11 
attacks, the NATO war in Afghanistan, and the US war on Iraq, as well as the 
fast change of Japan’s security environment (North Korean military build-
up and the rise of China) have of course led to a change of centre of gravity 
in both Canadian and Japanese security policies. But both countries kept 
nevertheless human security policies on track, and could combine the reference 
to human security with their participation to some of the US-led “hard security” 
responses to terrorism, WMD proliferation, and regional conflicts (like Canadian 
contribution to the war in Afghanistan or Japanese deployment of non-combatant 
troops in Iraq and involvement in the US anti-missile project). Rather than 
contradictory, those “soft security” and “hard security” dimensions look rather 
complementary and keep at low cost a national identity on the world stage for 
Canada and Japan fully compatible with their alliance with the USA.
This post-2001 evolution shows once more the catch-all dimension of 
the human security concept and its potential for adaptation to many political 
uses. Despite this comparative advantage its has been almost ignored in official 
security documents of the European Union like the European Security Strategy 
adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003. In other words, 
despite a converging peace-building agenda with Canada and Japan and a strong 
socialization framework through the OECD/DAC and a same interest to fill a 
niche as “civilian power” in world politics during the 1990s, Europeans have not 
identified human security as the major keyword for selling this agenda to their 
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public opinions.
III. The Hour of Europe?
Indeed, European states were facing a different political timing than 
Canada and Japan during the late 1990s. After having used and abused all 
possible “post-modern” discourses about “civilian power Europe” and its “sui 
generis nature” in order to justify the absence of military dimension in the 
European Communities’ and later on Union’s competences,(41) the European 
states faced in 1999 the need to justify their decision to develop a military arm 
as decided during the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki meetings of the European 
Council after the Saint-Malo compromise between Jacques Chirac and Tony 
Blair.(42) This implied to militarize the EU’s approach to security but also to make 
it compatible with all national traditions, stretching from the French and British 
nuclear, military and post-colonial powers to the neutral political cultures, or 
from countries spending little for defence to intermediate powers like Germany 
which combine a tradition of military self-restrain with a recent assertive 
participation in NATO’s offensive actions (Kosovo, Afghanistan).
A concept like “human security” did not represent a good center of gravity 
for reconciling all these traditions and legitimizing the EU’s military build-
up. Other semantic tools have been used for representing the European new 
security convergence during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, the 
Helsinki European Council adopted in parallel two documents regarding EU’s 
security policies: one document about military aspects of crisis management and 
the other one about the civilian aspects of crisis management. This two-track 
approach (promoted by the Finnish Presidency in 1999 and deepened by the 
Swedish Presidency in 2001 when the EU adopted the Gothenborg Platform 
for Conflict Prevention) helped all member-states to fill a niche within the 
EU security policy and to shape at the same time a peculiar profile for the EU 
emphasizing the originality of its approach combining military and civilian 
instruments(43) for crisis management by contrast with the US emphasis on the 
use of force. By this reference to a “policy mix” combining the military and 
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civilian dimensions, the EU could at the same time build an internal consensus, 
including NGOs and military forces, and keep an international profile different 
from the US and even to some extent go on referring to its “civilian power” 
nature despite the militarization of its agenda.(44) One of the founding fathers of 
this EU vision, the British senior diplomat Robert Cooper, who successively 
advised British prime Minister Tony Blair and EU High Representative for 
CFSP Javier Solana, has perfectly summarized this in his writings in which he 
describes the EU as a “post-modern” power and pleas for its military build-up.(45)
The EU’s High Representative for CFSP appointed in 1999, Javier Solana, 
has deepened this all-encompassing definition of EU’s security policy by 
pointing it as the most holistic and multi-faceted ever. The European Security 
Strategy, adopted by the European Council on December 12, 2003 under the 
title A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy perfectly 
illustrates this discourse.(46) The strategy articulates a framework based upon a 
comprehensive or holistic approach to security which helped to reconcile EU’s 
positions after the divergences about the Iraqi war. EU and its member states are 
told to co-operate in tackling their security priorities within the context of 
“effective multilateralism” (specifically the UN and regional organisations) and 
the promotion of the rule of law, but also by emphasizing the principle of the 
use of force as a last resort.  This means that even security “threats” (weapons 
of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, terrorism and organized 
crime) should be addressed through “effective multilateralism”: in other words, 
by supporting the UN system, strengthening national responses through EU 
synergies, and by addressing root causes such as poverty and weak governance 
through community instruments and regional dialogue.(47) Javier Solana 
considers indeed that this holistic approach proves the difference between 
Europe and America. He argues, with reference to a comprehensive notion of 
security, that active engagement is in Europe’s security interests since these are 
affected by poor governance, insecurity, poverty, and conflict far beyond its 
borders. Europe must therefore meet these challenges, which it is well placed 
to do with a range of diplomatic, development, economic, humanitarian, and 
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military instruments.(48) EU’s discourse on holistic security and the combination 
on military and civilian aspects of crisis management play mutatis mutandis 
the same role as the catch-all concept of human security for Canada and Japan 
helping them to build an international identity without undermining their close 
relationship with the United States of America. 
To some extent, what Canada or Japan call “human security” can be 
integrated into this holistic view but the European Union and its member states 
had no interest in the late 1990s and early 2000s to make “human security” 
central in their vocabulary. Furthermore, like Canada and Japan after 9.11 
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, who made human security one of the 
components of their security policies rather than their cornerstones, Europe 
can also play several diplomatic cards by keeping some particular tones (e.g., 
about the rise of its military role) and applying at the same time the core 
human security agenda without qualifying it as such. It would be typical of 
the EU’s constructive ambiguity helping to reconcile its member-states with 
different political cultures. This explanation is confirmed by the fact that, despite 
their absence from any key official security document, the words “human 
security” have surfaced within the EU’s security discourse, but as one dimension 
of the “holistic and multi-faceted security” approach.
The process started already in the late 1990s when Sweden took with Japan 
the initiative leading to the creation of the Commission on Human Security 
while Canada and Norway convinced five EU countries (Austria, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Slovenia) to take part in the Human Security 
Network. Furthermore, before the UN Millennium Summit, a joint EU-Japan 
Declaration also used the concept once.(49) But the large member States, Javier 
Solana, and the European Commission had less interest for such a concept, at 
least for giving much centrality to it since they had already other keywords for 
addressing the conflict prevention and peace-building agendas and needed a 
wider definition helping to legitimize the expanding security agenda of the EU 
and its militarization.
But Javier Solana had also the interest to create a wide support and 
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legitimacy for the European Security Strategy (ESS) and for the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) whose implementation started in 2003 
with the first EU police and military missions in the Balkans and DR Congo. 
Therefore, he started a dialogue with several promoters of human security among 
NGOs and academia by commissioning in 2003 a report to a group of scholars 
led by Mary Kaldor (London School of Economics) named the Barcelona Study 
Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. 
This report published in 2004 is the basis for most of the attempts currently 
promoting the adoption of the Human Security concept by the European 
institutions. Members of the Barcelona Group had all a mixed background in 
research institutes who took a position in favor of human security, international 
organizations, peace NGOs, or policymaking positions. The logistic support to 
the group by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation (linked to the German SPD) and 
by the Barcelona-based peace institute CIDOB also indicate that this group is 
part of an epistemic community gathering former peace activists and researchers 
linked to the European social-democrats. Besides the report delivered to 
Javier Solana in 2004, the group has produced one book and several articles 
disseminating the plea for a “Human Security Doctrine for Europe”(50) and 
widening the research community concerned. The Barcelona group’s discourse 
about human security has a lot of commonalities with the Japanese and Canadian 
discourses of the late 1990s, especially in their normative, individual-centered 
and civilian/soft security dimensions. But the European group also develops its 
own doctrinal sources. It refers not only to the conclusions of the Commission 
on Human Security, but also to the European Security Strategy(51) and seems to 
adopt the paradoxical argument of the main author of the ESS, Robert Cooper, 
who at the same time shares Robert Kagan’s caricatural definition of the EU 
as a post-modern neo-Kantian paradise(52) and challenges it by proposing a 
military build-up for Europe.(53) Furthermore, the Barcelona group’s rationale for 
supporting human security refers not only to moral and legal dimensions – like 
Axworthy and Obuchi – but also to an “enlightened self-interest case,”(54) mixing 
value-centered and interest-oriented rationales in order to reconcile idealist and 
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realist visions like Robert Cooper himself does. 
Rather than converging with the Japanese concept, an EU approach inspired 
by the Barcelona group would rather be closer to the Canadian Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine. Despite the emphasis of its promoters on “civilian capabilities” 
in case studies mixing natural disasters, secessionist movements, and open 
conflicts,(55) they might contribute to legitimize intervention and “militarize” 
development rather than to “civilianize” security, as often said about the R2P 
doctrine itself.(56) By proposing a synthesis between all previous approaches 
to human security, a combination of military and civilian capabilities and a 
discourse very similar to Javier Solana’s ambivalent emphasis on the holistic 
definition of security, the Barcelona report and its promoters might contribute 
to the widest catch-all security concept ever produced. It is nevertheless very 
meaningful that Javier Solana himself is almost never using the reference to 
human security in his own speeches and goes on with the previous mantra about 
holistic and multi-faceted security policy.
The intensification of the reference to human security comes rather from 
some sectors of the European Commission who initially did not find any special 
interest (both in DG DEV and DG RELEX) in using this concept since they had 
other semantic ways to address the security-development nexus and civilian 
approaches to security. The change in the Commission’s discourse clearly came 
in 2004 with the appointment of Benita Ferrero-Waldner as Commissioner for 
External Relations. Austria, the country she had been the Foreign Minister of 
between 1999 and 2004, is a member of the Human Security Network, and the 
right-ultra-right-wing government to which she had belonged moved from the 
traditional neutrality of social-democratic inspiration to a more assertive and 
interventionist position in international relations though neutrality and non-
NATO membership remained the official doctrine. To some extent, the Austrian 
conservatives have been able to diversify and adapt the country’s foreign policy 
like Canada and Japan. Furthermore the normative content of the human security 
discourse was useful for combining traditional neutrality with some external 
projection of Austria’s interests abroad.
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When she became Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner anyway had to imagine new concepts allowing to cope with the new 
challenges of EU external relations after the enlargement stretching from its 
wide peace-building activities all around the world to the stabilization of the 
Balkans, the new neighbourhood policy, the EU presence in Afghanistan, or 
the co-operation with the US regarding fight against terrorism and WMD.(57) 
This need was also inspired by the willingness to keep a high profile for the 
Commission despite High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana’s increasing 
role and to keep some difference within the Commission with the Commissioner 
for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel.
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner started soon in 2004 highlighting her 
“personal commitment to the concept of human security” defined as “putting 
people and their human rights, as well as the threats they face, at the centre of 
our policies.”(58) She integrated easily this definition centered on the individual 
into a discourse referring to all military and non-military challenges that the 
ESS had defined since December 2003. For her, even the fight against terrorism 
was part of the broad human security agenda(59)– a way also likely to keep some 
role in this field mainly addressed by the Council and by Commissioner Franco 
Frattini.
In 2006, she also referred to human security when addressing wide security 
policies related to the peace-building agenda and link with development policies, 
while Commissioner Louis Michel and DG DEV were not using the concept. 
This was obviously allowing her to embrace the whole security-development 
nexus and challenge Michel’s portfolio (in non-ACP countries at least). In May 
2006, for example, she emphasized the importance of “promoting human rights 
and democracy, fighting poverty, confronting the illicit spread of small arms and 
light weapons, and encouraging economic development (by) tackling inequalities 
and potential environmental, migration and conflict threats.”(60) In June 2006, she 
insisted that “Humanity will not enjoy security without development, and it will 
not enjoy development without security.”(61) In a speech delivered at the Overseas 
Development Institute in London in October 2006 about Human Security and 
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the Efficiency of Aid,(62) she referred not only to the usual peace-building agenda 
(conflict prevention, security sector reform, fight against small arms and light 
weapons, attention paid to vulnerable populations like women and children, and 
support to international humanitarian law) but also openly to development issues 
(food policy, Millennium Development Goals), and added a long reference to 
environmental challenges and climate change.
Those environmental features had almost been ignored both in the Japanese 
and Canadian concepts (except in the initial official Japanese speeches in 
the mid-1990s). By introducing them into the European approach to human 
security, Benita Ferrero-Waldner supports the new European discourse using 
environment, climate change, and energy challenges as a component of the 
European international identity. Furthermore, the first document from DG DEV 
ever using the expression “human security” has been the strategy towards the 
Horn of Africa published in 2006 which defines as “human security” issues: 
“human and social rights and gender, demographic issues, and the environment 
(water, coastal zones and forest sustainable management, desertification, and 
adaptation to climate change).”(63)
This recent intensification of references to human security seems to indicate 
that more actors within the Commission believe in this concept’s added value 
and that they introduce new dimensions into it. Again, despite the convergence 
in many policy agendas, the European concept of human security – if it prevails 
one day – might be rather divergent from the Canadian and Japanese ones.
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in Comparative Perspective
<Summary>
Eric Remacle
This article explores the origins of human security in policy agendas, 
why and how it has been used in policy formulation in Canada, Japan, and the 
European Union and proposes explanations of the divergences between those 
three international actors about the political use of this concept though their 
concrete policymaking agendas are rather convergent. It concludes that the 
success of the concept is mainly based on the need for some international actors 
(both in states and in the United Nations apparatus) to build a new legitimacy on 
global norm entrepreneurship in a time of change. Furthermore the paper shows 
that this lack of common normative discourse has not prevented Canada, Europe, 
and Japan to shape together with other industrialized states – including the 
USA –a “liberal peace” agenda summarized by the keywords “peace-building” 
and “security-development nexus” by rather intrusive policies of political, 
economic, judicial and security control of post-conflict areas by Western donors 
and international agencies. Though weakened in its wide scope by the US-
led fight against terrorism since 9.11.2001, human security has also proven to 
be very flexible and almost fully compatible with both neo-liberal economic 
agendas and “hard security” policies inspired by the US Administration. On the 
other hand, the new European discourse using environment, climate change and 
energy challenges as a component of the European international identity might 
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be rather divergent from the Canadian and Japanese concepts of human security.
